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DICTA

THE INVESTIGATING POWER OF CONGRESS:
ITS SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
JOSEPH F. DOLAN of the Denver Bar*

The United States Supreme Court, in its most recent opinion
dealing with the subject of the investigating power of Congress,
said: "There is wide concern both in and out of Congress, over
some aspects of the exercise of the Congressional power of investigation."' The statement was not an exaggerated one when
made. If made today, it would be an understatement of considerable
proportions.
Even the less perceptive observers of the American political
scene must by now be aware that Congressional investigations are
a subject about which almost everyone has an opinion. As is the
case with other aspects of the political world, much of the opinion
is based upon emotion and instinct rather than upon intellect. Laymen and lawyers alike praise, condone, and condemn committees,
committee chiairmen, committee procedures, etc., frequently without recourse to any of the available facts. In the recent Zwicker
incident, 2 millions had opinions, yet probably not more than one in
ten thousand read the transcript of the hearing and not one in a
hundred thousand took the time to inform himself of the legal issues involved. It is therefore fitting and proper that, in the midst
of the turbulence and turmoil of political strife, we pause to consider just what it is all about.
THE BACKGROUND

The subject of Congressional investigating power has been
considered extensively in legal literature. 3 This is not the first time
in our history that such investigations have been the subject of
*Mr. Dolan served as Chief Counsel to the U. S. House Select Committee on
Lobbying Activities in 1950; he also served as Liaison Representative of the
Executive Branch of Government with the same Committee.
'U. S. v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953).
- See Hearings before Senate Committee on Government Operations, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 83d Congress, 2d Sess. (1954).
'Leading works include:
Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investi-

gation, 40 HARv. L. REV. 153 (1926).
Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 691 (1926).

McGeary, Development of Congressional Investigative Power, (1940).
See also Congressional Investigations: A Symposium, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev.

421-661 (1951).

For analyses and criticisms of the work of particular committees, see:
Constitutional Limitations on the Un-American Activities Committee, 47

COLUMBIA L. REV. 416 (1947); 'Investigating Powers of the House Un-American
Activities Committee, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 565 (1948); The Un-American Activities
Committee, 18 U. OF CHi. L. REV. 598 (1951); Senate Preparedness Subcommittee. 18 U. OF CHi. L. REV. 634 (1951); House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, 18 U. OF Cri. L. REV. 647 (1951); and Subcommittee on Monopoly
Poirer of the House Judiciary Committee. 18 U. OF Cir. L. REV. 658 (1951).

286

DICTA

August, 1954

widespread derogatory comment. Criticism has been sharp at times
in the past, 4 but in general the legal writers have indicated a desire to have the scope and limitations of the power determined by
principles of law rather than by a desire to clip the wings of some
transient demagogue who happens to be flitting across the American political scene.
Congressional investigations have a long and tempestuous history in the United States.- One of the first recorded legislative investigations in the United States was that by the House of Representatives into General St. Clair's disaster in the Northwest Territory in 1792.6
The Constitution makes no provision for Congressional investigations. The English parliament and colonial legislatures,
however, exercised investigatory powers before the adoption of our
own Constitution ;7 and the Congress possesses an inherent power
to investigate to aid in the discharge of its legislative function
under a tri-partite system of government. The U. S. Constitution
gives Congress the power to legislate s The U. S. Code contains
several sections which are based on an assumed inherent legislative power to investigate. Provision is made for administration of
oaths to witnesses 9, and for refusal of witnesses to testify."'
4 See Wigmore, Legislative Power to Compel Testimonial Disclosure, 19 ILL.
L. REV. 452 (1925), where the Teapot Dome investigation is described thus:
The Senatorial debauch of investigations . . . poking into political
garbage cans and dragging the sewers of political intrigue . . . filled
the winter . . . with a stench which has not yet passed away . . . the
Senate . . . fell . . . in popular estimate to the level of professional
searchers of the municipal dunghills...
.For an excellent thorough historical summary, see Landis, op cit. supra
note 3. See also CongressionalInvestigations, 41 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY 618 (1951); and Galloway, The Investigative Function o1 Congress,
21Aw. PoL. Sci. Rev. 47 (1927).
'Annals of Cong. 490 (1792).
'Landis, op cit. supra note 3 at 159; Fields v. U. S. (App. D. C. 1947) 164
F2d 97, 99, cert. den., 332 U. S. 851 (1948).
8U. S. CONST. Art. I § 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives."

'§ 191 Oaths to witnesses
The President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, or a chairman of any joint committee established by a joint
or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or of a committee of the whole, or of any committee of either House of Congress,
is empowered to administer oaths to witnesses in any case under their
examination.
Any member of either House of Congress may administer oaths to
witnesses in any matter depending in either House of Congress of which
he is a Member, or any committee thereof. Stat. 942, 2 U.S.C. §191.
"§192 Refusal of witness to testify
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce
papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any
joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the
two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress,
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Congressional investigations first began to capture the public's imagination in the period following the Civil War, and the increased power and influence of the press was a not insignificant
factor in the change. The controversial, front-page investigation
which arouses public indignation-sometimes against the investigators, sometimes against the investigated-has been said to have
been "created by the press-the press has been its power and its
undoing.""
From time to time Congress passes statutes which require disclosure of facts it deems necessary to assist it in legislating, like
12
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act and the Federal Lobbying Act. 3
Courts.
the
by
upheld
been
The right of Congress to do so has
But these statutes are only a small part of the investigative function of the Congress. By far the biggest proportion of the power
is manifested by inquiries conducted by the Houses of Congress
themselves, or by Committees thereof.
The legislative inquiry has been described as "the logical concomitant and indispensable subsidiary of the legislative powers
[whose place] has never been seriously challenged and the Supreme
Court, with one notable exception, has shown a wise and underlimitastandable reluctance to interfere with or impose significant '14
tions upon the Congress in the use of this legislative tool.
Congressional investigations may be carried out by permanent
("standing") committees or by temporary ("select") committees.
In the former case, the chairman is invariably picked on the basis
of seniority in the majority party and tenure on the Committee. In
the latter case, custom dictates that the member who introduced
the resolution creating the committee shall be its chairman. In
general, controversy has centered more on the activities of select
committees. This may well be because select committees "enable
young and energetic members to sidestep the seniority custom, to
employ expert and zealous personnel, and to conduct vigorous and
searching investigations into vital public questions."' 15
willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any
question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000
nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less
than one month nor more than twelve months. 52 Stat. 942. 2 U.S.C.
§192.
11 Congressional Investigations, 38 GEO. L. J. 343 (1950).
"The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1070, 2 U.S.C. §§241-256; The
Federal Lobbying Act, 60 Stat. 842, 2 U.S.C. §§261-270.
3Burroughs v. U. S., 290 U. S. 534 (1934), sustaining the Corrupt Practices Act; U. S. v. Harriss, - U. S., - (1954), 98 L. Ed. 661, June 21, 19.54, sustaining the Federal Lobbying Act.
14Keele, Note on CongressionalInvestigations, 40 A.B.A.J. 154 (1954). The
exception is stated to be Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
Galloway, Congress in Action, 28 NEB. L, REv. 493 (1949). The seniority
custom usually requires many years of legislative service before a member becomes a Chairman. The Junior Senator from Wisconsin was able to become
Chairman of a standing Committee after only five years of service principally
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Two of the present members of the United States Supreme
Court are on record for strong Congressional investigating power.
Justice Black has stated: "There is no power on earth that can tear
away the veil behind which operate powerful and audacious and unscrupulous groups save the sovereign legislative power armed with
the right of subpoena and search." 16 Back in another period of
criticism of Congressional investigations, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said: ". . . the procedure of Congressional investigation should remain as it is. No limitation should be imposed by Congressional
legislation or standing rules. The power of investigation should be
left untrammelled, and the methods and form of each investigation
should be left for determination of Congress and its Committees,
'1 7
as each situation arises.'
The problem is not exclusively an American one. Legislative
power of inquiry exists to varying degrees in other nations of the
world, but only in France has it achieved the controversial status
8
before the public that it has in America.
The number of Congressional inquiries here in America has
increased in recent years,' 9 as has the amount of public interest in
them. The advent of television, more than any other single factor,
has brought the entire legislative process closer to all of the people;
and it is likely that public interest will continue to wax strong.
THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATING POWER
The Congressional power of investigation is limited to matters reasonably pertinent to an inquiry which bears a reasonable
relationship to a subject as to which Congress may validly legislate.2 0 Investigations must be in aid of a legislative purpose. However, a bona fide legislative purpose will be presumed. 21 The pre22
sumption is probably conclusive.
Congress may investigate to determine qualifications of its
members, or circumstances surrounding their elections, both general and primary.2 3 The inquiry may be directed toward establishbecause the Committee in question was created, just prior to his election, by
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Members of the Senate with greater
seniority chose Committee assignments then considered to be of greater importance.
16Inside a Senate Investigation, 172 HARPERs 275, 276 (1936).
"Hands Off the Investigations, 38 NEW REPUBLIC 329, 331 (1924).
IsFor an interesting commentary on the practical effects of lack of strong
investigative powers in foreign legislatures, see Ehrmann, The Duty of Disclosure in Parliamentary Investigation: A Comparative Study, 11 U. OF CHI.
L. REV. 1 (1943) and 117 (1944).
19It has been estimated that the 82d Congress alone appropriated $5,700,000
for 236 special investigations. 10 Congressional Quarterly 941 (1953).
"0McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927).
21 In
re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S.
135 (1927).
.=See U.S. v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
'Reed
v. County Commissioners, 277 U. S. 376 (1928); U. S. v. Norris,
300 U. S. 564 (1937).
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ment of facts on which to base an impeachment proceeding,2 4 or
expulsion or censure of a member. 25 The investigation may concern
itself with the administration of a portion of the executive branch
of the Government, 6 and use or misuse of appropriated funds. 27
Although much has been written and said about the "informing function of Congress, '28 there has not been any judicial ruling
upholding an investigation solely on that basis. 29 As long as the
presently recognized broad scope of legislative purpose remains,
the question will almost certainly continue to be an academic one.3 0
4Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 at 190 (1880).
"In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897).
11McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927). This power is accepted by
all writers on the subject.
" Innumerable investigations of the executive branch have been conducted
on this basis. Query, would a similar investigation of the judicial branch be
valid?
1 See WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT, 303 (15th Ed., 1913) where it
is stated that this function is more important than the legislative function.
While the latter could exist without the former, it is difficult to see how the
former could exist without the latter. In the recent case of U. S. v. Rumely,
345 U. S. 41 (1953), noted elsewhere herein, the court, per Mr. Justice Frankfurter, quoted the following excerpt from "Congressional Government" as an
example of the "reach that may be claimed" for the investigative power of
Congress:
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently
into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees.
It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom
and will of its constituents. Unless Congress have and use every
means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the
administrative agents of the government, the country must be helpless
to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize
these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country
must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs
which it is most important that it should understand and direct. The
informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. (Emphasis added).
The same quotation has more recently been set forth in the annual report
of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, made by its Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations. The Subcommittee, chairmaned by Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy and guided by Chief Counsel Roy M. Cohn, states that the
Wilson quote was "cited by the Supreme Court in U. S. v. Rumeley (sic)."
' See dictum in Electric Bond and Share Co. v. S.E.C., 303 U. S. 419, at 437
(1938). In McGrain v. Daugherty the court said that "the only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in legisating." 273 U. S. 135, 177 (1927).
30 The question could conceivably arise out of a practice of some contemporary investigating committees. A witness is called before the committee
in executive session, away from the prying of the press and the public. The
witness answers some questions of Committee Counsel, refuses to answer others.
Some of the questioning is adjudged by the Committee Chairman to be valuable
in furthering his personal ambitions, and some testimony does not meet that
test. The witness is then called before a public session, same Committee, same
Chairman, same Counsel. Only the questioning which is to the Chairman's selfpresumed advantage is repeated. The witness refuses to answer and is cited
for contempt. The questions were pertinent to a legislative purpose, and no
constitutional question of privilege, freedom of speech, etc., was raised. May
the witness be convicted of contempt based exclusively on the public refusal?
Some writers on the subject would apparently answer yes, as they have
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Some legislative investigations are undoubtedly carried on for
reasons of political aggrandizement, personal or party, but such a
purpose provides no legal basis for an investigation.
The development and effective use of the Congressional investigation has been acclaimed as the best method of restoring the
balance of separate government powers. 31 Legislative investigations
provide the best method by which the Congress can learn the facts
necessary to an intelligent determination of what legislation is
needed and what legislation is not needed. A former President of
the United States has declared:
...
the power of investigation is one of the most important powers of the Congress. The manner in which
that power is exercised will largely determine the position and prestige of the Congress in the future. An informed Congress is a wise Congress; an uninformed Congress surely will forfeit 3a2large portion of the respect and
confidence of the people.

Congress may investigate over a wide range of subject matters
in furtherance of a legislative purpose. It appears that Congress
may validly investigate in areas where its power to legislate is
limited. 33 But see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas
(in which Justice Black concurred) in U. S. v. Rumely where it is
stated that inquiry is precluded into "any matter in respect to
which no valid legislation could be had. '34 Those who assert that
asserted that investigating committees have free scope of inquiry merely to
bring facts to the public attention. See McGeary, op. cit. supra notes 3 at 104;
Herwitz and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee, 33 COL. L. REV.
4 at 6 (1933) ; Ehrmann, op cit. supra note 18. It is submitted that legislative
purposes have been served by the executive session, and that a contempt citation based solely on the public testimony would not be valid.
"Meader, Limitations on Congressional Investigation, 47 MIcH. L. REV.
775 (1949).
3o Senator Harry S. Truman, 90 Cong. Rec. 6747 (Aug. 7, 1944).
See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946);
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501 (1943); I.C.C. v. Goodrich
Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 (1912). In the Oklahoma Press Publishing case it was
held that the First Amendment did not preclude a subpoena by an administrative official requiring a newspaper to disclose the interstate distribution of its
paper, dissemination of its news, or the source of its advertising receipts. In
the I.C.C. case it was stated that ". . . requiring . . . information concerning a
business is not regulation of that business . . ." In the Oklahoma Press Publishing case the court brought under consideration the power of Congress itself to
investigate, although the actions of an administrative agency were being questioned, stating:
For to deny the validity of the orders would be in effect to deny
not only Congress' power to enact the provisions sustaining them, but
also its authority to delegate effective power to investigate violations of
its own laws, if not perhaps also its own power to make such investigations.
-1345 U. S. 41 (1953), citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 194, 195
(1880); and McGrain v. Daugherty 273 U. S. 135, 171 (1927).
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Congress may inquire only in fields in which it may validly legislate overlook the fact that if this were the case, the existence or
non-existence of the power to inquire could often be determined only
by an inquiry itself .34a
If it is ever held that Congress may not investigate except in
fields where it may validly legislate, it may become pertinent to ascertain whether the Congressional power to propose amendments 35
enlarges its power of investigation. To date, the matter has not
been adjudicated. Law review writers frequently cite a British
case on the subject, 36 which answered in the negative as to the
Australian Constitution.
The investigating power of Congress may be likened to the
broad powers of a Grand Jury, where successful challenges to
power are few and far between. 37 It will thus be seen that the
scope of the investigative power of Congress is broad indeed, and
necessarily so. The legislative function encompasses decisions to
enact laws, but it includes more. It also necessarily includes the
power to decide what laws not to enact, and the gathering of information necessary to make such determinations. This is a broad
assignment and requires broad powers for its proper discharge.
It is often asserted that Congress may not compel any testimony with respect to matters of opinion or belief, religious, political, economic, or otherwise. 38 It must be remembered, however,
that questions may legitimately be asked relating to acts of an indi39
vidual which may incidentally touch upon a person's beliefs.
When such beliefs also involve some other interest into which the
Congress may legitimately inquire, the public purpose must and
will override the private belief. Purely personal private affairs
into which Congress may not pry40 are no longer personal when
41
they become pertinent to a Congressional inquiry.
Congress need not specify what sort of legislation, if any, is
expected to come from a committee in order to validate its in'" See the hypothetical situation outlined in Morgan, Congressional Investigations and Judicial Reviews: Kilbourn v. Thompson Revisited, 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 556 (1949).
M U. S. CONST., Art. V. "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . ."
'Attorney-General
v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. (1914) A.C. 233 (P.C.
1913).
"7Some grand jury powers are described in Blair v. U. S., 250 U. S. 273, 282
(1919), which, significantly, was cited with approval in the Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. case.
"See Boudin, Congressional and Agency Investigations: Their Uses and
Abuses, 35 VA. L. REV. 143 (1949).
*"Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?"
The propriety of this question has been sustained by the courts. Barsky v. U. S.,
167 F2d 241 (C.A.D.C., 1948) ; cert. den. 334 U. S. 843 (1948).
" Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880).
" McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927); U. S. v. Barsky, 167 F2d
241 (C.A.D.C., 1948), cert. den. 334 U. S. 843 (1948).
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quiries.4 2 Nor is it of any significance that no legislation has resulted from the Committee's work. 42 It is enough that there is a
mere possibility that some legislation will result, and it is immaas well as valid legislation may stem from the
terial that invalid
44
investigation.
Those who would further restrict the investigating power of
Congress invariably cite Kilbourn v. Thompson,45 which has been
described as the "low water mark of the Congressional power of
investigation. ' 4 Kilbourn v. Thompson has been criticized by the
United States Supreme Court for its "loose language," and note
has been made of "the weighty criticism to which it has been subjected" and the "inroads that have been made upon it by later
7
cases."

4

APPLICABILITY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS

First Amendment
The First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution 4 has not been
successfully asserted to date as a valid reason for refusing to
answer questions or to produce papers for a Congressional investigation. Either of two of the provisions of the First Amendment
might be cited as grounds for refusal:
(1) freedom of speech, or
(2) freedom of the press.
A recent attack on a prosecution for contempt of Congress al49
leged a violation of this Amendment and failed.
At least one witness has been cited for contempt for refusing
to answer questions of a Congressional committee solely on the
grounds of protection allegedly afforded by the First Amendment. 0
The basis of such a refusal has been severely criticized as "a meMcGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927); In re Chapman, 166 U. S.
661 (1897).
1 Townsend v. U. S., 95 F2d 352 (C.A.D.C., 1938) ; cert. den., 303 U. S.
664 (1948).
44 Barsky v. U. S., 167 F2d 241
(C.A.D.C., 1948); cert. den., 334 U. S. 843
(1948).
( 103 U. S. 168
(1881).
"McGeary, The CongressionalPower of Itvestigation, 28 NEiRASK.]- L. Ri:v.
516 (1949).
11U. S. v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953); the criticism is stated to include
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME CouuT, 332-34, Landis, op. cit.
supra note 3; the inroads are stated to have been made by McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135,.170, 171, (1927) and Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
""Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."
49U. S. v. Emspack, 95 F Supp. 1010 (D.C., D.C. 1951).
'Harvey O'Connor, cited by the U. S. Senate July 23, 1953 and indicted by
federal grand jury October 16, 1953.
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chanical interpretation of the First Amendment." 51 Another witness refused to answer because
of the First Amendment and ad52
vice of Dr. Albert Einstein.
The "clear and present danger" tests used to evaluate legislation under the First Amendment are patently inapplicable to Congressional investigations to determine whether allegedly subversive movements constitute a danger either to the security of the
nation or to its very existence.
Fourth Amendment
The operation of a Congressional investigation is subject to
the "unreasonable searches and seizures" provision of the Fourth
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.53 Injunctions have been
granted on the basis of this provision. 4 Subpoenas which are unreasonably broad and vague may violate this Amendment. The
validity of questions relating56 to stock transactions of a member of
the Senate has been upheld.
Fifth Amendment
A witness before a Congressional committee may refuse to
answer questions on the grounds of the privilege against self-incrimination which is contained in the Fifth Amendment.5 7 Immunity from prosecution based on the Fifth Amendment is granted
only when the Constitutional privilege is asserted. 57 Moreover,
the immunity extends only to the specific testimony made, and
not to evidence discovered as a result of the testimony. The testimony of a witness before a Congressional committee may be introduced in a contempt prosecution based on the testimony despite
the fact that a literal reading of the statute might lead to the opposite conclusion. 58
" Nutting, Freedoom of Silence, 47 MicH. L. REV. 181 (1948). Nutting contends that we should assume that "freedom of silence" is a liberty protected by
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, which does not necessarily
have the same content as the free speech portion of the First Amendment.
" Albert Shadowitz. See New York Times, Dec. 17, 1953, p. 1. The witness
was cited for contempt August 16, 1954. 100 Congressional Record 13935 (Daily
Edition).
" U. S. CONST., Amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
" Strawn v. Western Union, Eq. 60 814-36, Sup. Ct., D.C., unreported (1936).
The case is discussed further in note 78 below.
I Such a holding re administrative agencies will be found in F.T.C. v.
American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924). See also Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 at 209 (1946).
In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897).
5 U. S. CONST., Amend. V. ". . . nor shall any person be compelled in any
case to be a witness against himself . . ."
criminal
61T May v. U. S., 175 F2d 994 (C.A.D.C.), cert. den. 338 U. S. 830 (1949).
"U. S. v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950); U. S. v. Fleischman, 339 U. S. 349
(1950); Barsky v. U. S., 167 F2d 241 (C.A.D.C.), cert. den. 334 U. S. 843 (1948).
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Congress may meet refusals to testify by a grant of immunity
to witnesses, who must then testify. 59 Congress has seen fit to enact a statute giving a degree of immunity to persons testifying before Congressional committees. 60 The statute extends its protection to witnesses whether or not they claim the Constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, and it applies in state courts
as well as federal.6 ' The present statute does not give witnesses
complete immunity from prosecution, and thus is not broad enough
for Congress to2be able to compel witnesses to give self-incriminat6
ing testimony.
The Supreme Court has held that witnesses before federal
grand juries may refuse to answer questions dealing with Communist party activities on the grounds that the answers might
tend to incriminate the witness.6 3 The same
privilege extends to
6 4
testimony before Congressional committees.
There has been no reported adjudication of the question of
whether a Congressional investigating committee may deny the
claim of privilege where the possibility of incrimination is without
substance. In judicial proceedings, the court has the power to
make such a determination.6 5
The resolution creating one committee has been upheld as
against an attack that it violated the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment as setting up no recognizable standards for the
scope of the committee or for its conduct.6 6 The due process clause
has produced much litigation concerning the validity of the end
products of the legislative process, laws themselves. Strangely
enough, it has not often been relied on as grounds for attack on the
intermediate steps in the legislative process. If it were seized upon
by the courts as a device to increase the scope of judicial review of
the investigating power of Congress, the result might well be a
considerable disturbance in the existing equilibrium among the
branches of government.
5Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
611 Stat. 156 (1857), as amended 12 Stat. 333 (1862), as codified, Rev.
Stat. §859 (1875), as amended, 52 Stat. 943 (1938), as amended 62 Stat. 833, 18
U.S.C. §3486. The section reads as follows: Testimony before Congress: Immunity. "No testimony given by a witness before either House, or before any
Committee of either House, or before any joint committee established by a
joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, shall be used as
evidence in any criminal proceedings against him in any court, except in a
prosecution for perjury committed in giving such testimony. But an official
paper or record produced by him is not within the said privilege."
"Adams v. Maryland, - U. S. -, 98 L. Ed. 360 (1954).
0 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
63Blau v. U. S., 340 U. S. 159 (1950).
"U. S. v. Nelson (D.C., D.C.), 103 F. Supp. 215 (1952).
"Mason v. U. S., 244 U. S. 362 (1917).
"U. S. v. Dennis, 72 F. Supp. 417, (D.C., D.C. 1947), aff'd 171 F2d 986
(C.A.D.C. 1948), aff'd 339 U. S. 162 (1950), rehearing denied 339 U. S. 950
(1950).
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Sixth Amendment
The provisions of the Sixth Amendment 67 have no direct application to Congressional investigations, since such proceedings
are not criminal prosecutions. It has been asserted, however, that
the Amendment applies to all cases where a person is "put on
trial," whether the proceeding be strictly criminal or not, and that
therefore "vagueness in a resolution authorizing an investigation
is objectionable under the Sixth Amendment where an attempt
is made to put one 'on trial' under it." 68 In the unlikely event of a
judicial holding along these lines, a witness before a Congressional
Committee would, under certain circumstances, be entitled to (1)
be informed of the nature of the "accusation"; (2) be confronted
with witnesses against him; (3) have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and (4) have the assistance of
counsel.
OTHER CHALLENGES TO THE CONGRESSIONAL
POWER OF INVESTIGATION

False Testimony
Perjury before a Congressional committee is a federal crime,
a violation of the U. S. Code. 69 If the offense is committed within
the District of Columbia, the prosecution may be brought under
the District Code,7 0 which provides a greater penalty that the U. S.
Code.
Before a conviction for perjury for false testimony before a
Congressional committee may be sustained, it must appear that a
quorum was present when the offense was committed, for the
perjury must be before a "competent tribunal."7 ' What consti72
tutes a "quorum" is a matter for the Congress itself to decide.
The fact that the false statements complained of were subsequently
" "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
Counsel for his defense."
"Boudin, op cit. supra note 38.
62 Stat. 773, 18 U.S.C. §1621.
" D. C. Code § 22-2501.
" Christof'el v. U. S., 338 U. S. 84 (1949). This decision has been stated to
open up "a veritable Pandora's box of new implications of vastly extended ju-

dicial supervision and control over every step of the legislative process"
because the court "[held] that (1) the status of a standing committee of the
House of Representatives as a 'competent tribunal' within the meaning of the
District of Columbia perjury statute, and (2) the integrity of the committee's
records as to the presence of a quorum, could be impeached by parol evidence ..." Morgan, op. cit. supra note 34a.
The Christoffel case is discussed in a note Absence of Committee Quorum
as Defense to Perjury Charge, 49 CoL. L. REv. 1007 (1949).
'rU. S. CONST., Art. I,§5, cl. 2. "Each House may determine the rules of
its Proceedings."
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retracted does not prevent prosecution for perjury.7 2" In a perjury
prosecution,
the question of materiality of testimony is for the
7

court. 3

The "competent tribunal" test goes to the question of Committee jurisdiction. On this subject, the current controversy between the Department of the Army and the chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on
Government Operations presents a new problem. If perjury prosecutions are instituted, the question will arise as to whether the
committee had the power to investigate the relationship between
its staff and an executive department.7 4 However, the Legislative
Reference Service of the Library of Congress, which members
of congress frequently consult for advice as to the status of the
law, is of the opinion that it is very difficult "to attack successfully
the jurisdiction of Congressional Committees. 7 :
Suits for Injunctive Relief
The Congressional investigating power is sometimes challenged by civil suits for injunctions filed against the Committee
chairman, members of the committee staff, or persons in possession
of papers subpoenaed by a committee. Such attacks are, almost
without exception, unsuccessful. The judicial branch of our government is reluctant to inject itself into the legislative process.
A recent effort to enjoin a committee chairman, Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy, from forcing persons to produce documents in
12,U. S. v. Norris, 300 U. S. 564 (1937).
,3U. S. v. Weber, 197 F2d 237 (C. A. 2d, 1952); cert. den. 344 U. S. 834
(1952).
"4See debate in the U. S. Senate between Senators Ellender and McCarthy,
February 2, 1954, and memo of the Library of Congress there set forth, 100
Congressional Record 1048 (Daily Edition). The jurisdiction of the Committee
is fixed by statute as follows:
(g) (1) Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department, to consist of 13 Senators, to which committee shall be referred all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the following subjects:
(A) Budget and accounting measures, other than appropriations.
(B) Reorganizations to the executive branch of the Government.
(2) Such committee shall have the duty of(A) Receiving and examining reports of the Comptroller General
of the United States and of submitting such recommendations to the
Senate as it deems necessary or desirable in connection with the subject matter of such reports;
(B) studying the operation of Government activities at all levels
with a view to determining its economy and efficiency;
(C) evaluating the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of the Government;
(D) studying the intergovernmental relationships between the
United States and the States and municipalities, and between the
United States and international organizations of which the United
States is a member. (Committee name changed by S. Res. 280, 82d
Cong.)
Extension of Remarks of Hon. John W. McCormack, D., Mass., January
20, 1954, 100 Congressional Record A412 (Daily Edition), setting forth the text
of a memorandum prepared by the Service.
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their possession relating to loyalty board proceedings failed in the
federal courts."; Similarly, a suit for an injunction filed against
employees of the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities
failed in 1950.77
An injunction was issued in 1936 against the Western Union
Telegraph Company and others on the complaint of Silas H. Strawn
78
and others by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
The importance of this decision is somewhat lessened by the fact
that it was by a federal court of initial jurisdiction only, and the
defendant was neither a committee of Congress nor its members.
This decision has been described as moving "against the current
of court approval of investigations,"7 9 and doubt has been expressed

1

Fischler and Saltznan v. McCarthy, U. S. District Court, S.D. N.Y., Civ.
90-20. The opinion of I. R. Kaufman, D.J. noted that proper venue was in the
District of Columbia, no jurisdictional amount was established as required by
28 U.S.C. §1331, and that the type of question presented and the nature of the
relief sought was beyond the purview of the Judicial Branch of the Government.
" Committee for Constitutional Government and Edward A. Rumely v.
Louis Little et. al.,D.C., D.C., No. 2300-50.
'Strawn et. al. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. et. al., unreported (D.C.
Sup. Ct., 1936) Eq. 60814-36. See 3 U. S. LAW WEEK 646, New York Times,
March 12, 193'6, p. 1. Plaintiffs were members of a Chicago law firm. Defendants had in their possession copies of telegrams which they had transmitted
for plaintiffs. A Senate lobby investigating committee subpoenaed the copies of
all telegrams, sent paid and/or received collect between the dates of February
1 and December 1, 1934, and charged to Winston Strawn and Shaw, First National Bank Building, Chicago, Illinois, and all of its associates and subsidiaries, and all of their known officers, employees, and agents. It is worthy of
note that the subpoena did not restrict itself to copies of telegrams sent to or
received from specific persons, or to telegrams relating to legislation in some
way. Plaintiffs alleged in the complaint that many of the wires were privileged
communications between attorney and client, and husband and wife. Plaintiffs
alleged a contractual agreement with defendants providing for non-disclosure
and set out Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. §605)
and Sections 7 and 7a of Chgs. 134, Illinois Revised Statutes, both of which relate to the secrecy of telegraph messages. Plaintiffs further alleged that the
resolutions creating the Senate Committee violated the Fourth. Fifth, and
Tenth Amendments, and that the subpoena issued by the Committee went beyond the scope authorized by the resolutions, were insufficient and improper in
form and substance, and violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments. A
temporary restraining order was issued March 2, 1936, the day that the complaint was filed. A preliminary injunction was issued by Chief Justice Wheat on
March 11, 1936. The court stated that the subpoena was so broad that obedience
to it would result in "unreasonable and unlawful disclosure of telegrams which
are privileged and confidential communications between . . . attorneys . . .
and . . . clients . . . as to which the privilege has not been waived . . . (and
other private communications between friends, members of families, etc.) including privileged and confidential communications between husband and
wife .. ." The court also stated that the subpoena "is too broad and inclusive,
is improper in form and substance, and . . . enforcement ... would be contrary
to and in violation of prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures
contained in the 4th Amendment." After hearing on June 25, 1936, a permanent
injunction was granted by Chief Justice Wheat. The reasons set out by the
court were the same as those set out in the preliminary injunction. The above
details have been set forth because the decision, though frequently cited by
persons seeking to block Congressional investigations, has never been reported.
" McGeary, op. cit. supra note 46 at 522.
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that the United States Supreme Court would uphold such a decision.80 One of the present Justices of the Supreme Court was
chairman of the Congressional committee involved in the Strawn
case, and his views have been stated thus:
Mr. McAdoo. "I think the dignity, as well as the
power, of this body are such that when the Senate undertakes an investigation no court has the power to interfere
with the processes of the Senate."
Mr. Black. "I agree with the Senator fully."" '
Contempt
The most frequent challenge to the investigative power is by
contemptuous conduct. The right of Congress to provide punishment for contempt was upheld by the judiciary early in our history. 2 Contempt power as to members is given to the House and
Senate by the U. S. Constitution.8 3 Contempt power as to nonmembers was discussed at the Constitutional Convention, but no
action was taken.34 Specific grant of such power was unnecessary
in view of the general recognition of the power in the British Parliament and in colonial legislatures.8 5
The contempt may be of a house of Congress itself, or of one
of its committees. Either type is punishable. The contempt may be
tried by the house of Congress itself, or it may be referred to the
United States Attorney for prosecution under 2 U.S.C. §192.86 The
referral to the appropriate United States Attorney is specifically
provided for by statute.8 7 Prosecution and conviction under one
procedure does not preclude subsequent conviction under the
other.8 8
' Ehrmann, op. cit. supra note 18 at 134.
"80 Cong. Rec. 3329 (1936). See also Hearst V. Black, 87 F2d 68 (C.A.D.C.
1936), where the judicial branch of government held that it was without power
to restrain a Senate committee from use of documents obtained illegally.
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U. S.204, (1821).
U. S. CONST., Art. I, §5.

"For a review of colonial and early state precedents, see Potts, op. cit.
supra note 3.
See 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 341.

31The

text of §192 is set forth in footnote 10 above.
52 Stat. 942, 2 U.S.C. §194. Witnesses failing to testify or produce records.
"Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned in section 192 fails to appear to
testify or fails to produce any books, papers, records, or documents, as required,
or whenever any witness so summoned refuses to answer any question perti-nent to the subject under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee
established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress,
or any committee or subcommittee of either House of Congress, and the fact
of such failure or failures is reported to either House while Congress is in
session, or when Congress is not in session, a statement of fact constituting
such failure is reported to and filed with the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House, it shall be the duty of the said President of the Senate
or Speaker of the House, as the case may be, to certify, and he shall so certify,
the statement of facts aforesaid under the seal of the Senate or House. as the
case may be, to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall be
to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action."
"In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897).
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Adjudications of contempt by one of the houses of Congress
itself occur much less frequently than referral to federal attorneys
for prosecution under the U. S. Code.8 9 Upon direct adjudication
by the branch of Congress itself, the person held in contempt may
be imprisoned for the remainder of the legislative session during
which he was convicted.90
The amount of judicial review which is possible varies considerably in the two methods dealing with contempts. Where the
trial and adjudication are by the house of Congress itself, the court
is dealing with a legislative determination. On the other hand,
when a case comes before the judiciary after prosecution under
2 U.S.C. §192, the court's function is much more extensive. In such
cases it may consider whether the inquiry was authorized by and
pertinent to the committee's grant of existence. 91 The courts may
thus free persons voted in contempt by a committee and referred
by the Congress to the federal prosecutor without passing directly
on the power of Congress to investigate.
Contempt of Congress may consist of any one of a variety of
actions: failure to appear, refusal to be sworn, refusal to testify,
refusal to produce papers subpoenaed, or bribery of members. A
refusal to appear or to give information may be based on the
ground that the committee lacks jurisdiction to conduct the entire
investigation, or merely that it has not the authority to ask a specific question.
92
A refusal to be sworn as a witness is a refusal to testify.
This is so even if the witness expresses willingness to testify but
insists first on the right to make objection to Committee procedure.9 3 A person who voluntarily appears before a committee is
guilty of contempt if he thereafter refuses to testify.9 4 Even a
person brought before a committee involuntarily by force must
testify.9 5
Failure to answer questions before Congressional committees
is a violation of U. S. Code, §192, but only if the questions are
pertinent.9 6 The pertinency of questions is a matter of law which
the court decides,97 but under certain circumstances it may be nec19Instances
of direct adjudication by Congress of contempt include: Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U. S. 204 (1821); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881);
Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521 (1917); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135,
169 (1927); Barry v. U. S. ex. rel. Cunningham, 279 U. S. 597 (1929) ; Jurney v.
MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935).
"Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U. S. 204 (1821).
9U. S. v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953).
2U.
S. v. Josephson, 165 F2d 82 (C.A.2d, 1947), cert. den. 333 U. S. 838
(1948).
93Eisler
v. U. S., 170 F2d 273 (C.A., D.C. 1948), cert. granted 335 U. S. 857
(1948), dismissed, 338 U. S. 883 (1949).
4
1
Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
1Eisler v. U. S., 170 F2d 273, 279 (C.A.D.C. 1948) ; cert. granted, 335 U. S.
857 (1948); dismissed, 338 U. S. 883 (1949).
"Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
"Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
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essary to plead and show pertinency.98 It has been asserted that the
limitation of pertinence "has been reduced to almost complete insignificance." 99 The witness who doubts that the question is perti-.
nent acts at his peril if he refuses to answer. Vindication may
come, if at all, only after citation by the Congressional committee,
citation by the house of Congress, indictment, trial, appeal to an.
intermediate appellate court, and finally determination by the U. S.
Supreme Court. This can be an expensive proposition, and it presents practical objections to refusing to answer on the grounds that
the question is not pertinent.
The questions which an investigating committee of Congress
poses may cause an individual inconvenience, embarrassment, or
even substantial financial loss. Ridicule, social ostracism, economic
boycott-all may face the witness, and yet he must answer. The
public good and the general public interest has been weighed against
the cost to the individual, and, at the moment, the decision is that
the public interest is paramount, and will be served by disclosure.
A witness's good faith and honest belief that he is not legally
required to answer is no defense to a prosecution under §192.100
The elements of bad faith or evil purpose need not be present to
constitute "willful default."'' 1 Evidence that the witness refused to
answer because of advice of counsel is properly excluded. 10 2 The
lawyer-client privilege against disclosure is inapplicable to Congressional investigations 10 3 and is therefore no grounds for refusal
by a lawyer to testify.
A witness may not refuse to testify on ground that his "right
of privacy" is invaded. 10 4 However, where the presence of television and newsreel cameras disturbs a witness, refusal to testify
may not be contempt. 1 5 Also, where a Congressional committee
holds open hearings, the attendant publicity may be such that
criminal prosecutions of persons mentioned in the hearings will
have to be postponed in order to assure a trial free of hostile atmosphere and public preconception of defendant's guilt.106
Witnesses have from time to time refused to answer on the
ground that the replies will render them infamous, degrade them,
disgrace, or humiliate them. There is no legal basis for refusal on
'Bowers

v. U. S., 202 F2d 447 (C.A.D.C. 1953).

Driver, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Punish

Contempts of Its Investigating Committees, 38 VA. L. REV. 887 and 1011, at
1019 (1952).

ImSinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
101Fields v. U. S., 164 F2d 97 (C.A.D.C. 1947), cert. den. 332 U. S. 851 (1948).
'"-Dennis v. U. S., 171 F2d 986 (C.A.D.C. 1948), aff'd, 339 U. S. 162 (1950).
103Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935).
104See note, "Rights of Witnesses before Congressional Investigating Committees, 35 MARQ. L. REV. 282 (1952).
01U. S. v. Kleinman, 107 F Supp. 407 (D.C., D.C. 1952). For arguments in
favor of televising committee hearings, see "Rights of Witnesses before Congressional Investigating Committees," 35 MARQ. L. REV. 282 (1952), which cites,
inter alia, Senator Kefauver's arguments at 97 Cong. Rec. 9995 et seq.
1 See Delaney v. U. S., 199 F2d 107, (C.A., 1st, 1952).
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;these grounds. 10 7 On the contrary, the statutes expressly provide
otherwise. 0 8
A witness may attack the vagueness of the resolution creating
the committee before which he appears. Resolutions creating select committees, and statutes creating standing committees, however, provide no criminal sanctions in themselves and should not,
therefore, be construed as criminal statutes. Attacks on authorizing
resolutions are almost uniformly unsuccessful. 10 9 No witness has
successfully attacked a contempt citation on the ground that the
investigating committee was illegally constituted. 110 Nor is the fact
that a judicial proceeding is pending, based on the same facts, valid
grounds for refusal to testify."'
It has been shown above that once a person has been brought
before a Congressional Committee, the manner of his coming is
immaterial. However, a witness who refuses to appear may contest
the validity of the subpoena which compelled his attendance. 112 A
Congressional subpoena binds all persons served within the borders
of the United States, citizens or not, 113 and inadequacy of service
of the subpoena is not sufficient grounds for a court to upset a contempt adjudication. 114 A witness must produce subpoenaed documents if physically possible. 115 If a witness appears and refuses to
be sworn or to testify at all, he may not thereafter attack the
validity of the subpoena which brought him before the committee." 6' A witness who refuses to produce subpoenaed records may
not at a later date contest a finding to that effect by alleging the
117
absence of a quorum of the committee on the return date.
A special situation exists where a Congressional committee
"Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896); U. S. v. Thomas, 49 F. Supp.
547 (D.C., W.D. Ky., 1943).
10 §193. Privilege of witnesses. "No witness is privileged to refuse to testify
to any fact, or to produce any paper, respecting which he shall be examined by
either House of Congress, or by any joint committee established by a joint or
concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or by any committee of
either House, upon the ground that his testimony to such fact or his production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous."
52 Stat. 942, 2 U.S.C. §193.
"9But see U. S. v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953) where the court adopted a
narrow and unrealistic definition of the term "lobbying," possibly because of
an inability to find general agreement among its members as to the substantive
questions involved.
1oSuch attacks have been made. See Dennis v. U. S., 171 F2d 986 (C.A.D.C.
1948), aff'd 339 U. S. 162 (1950), re-hearing denied, 339 U. S. 950 (1950).
"I Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263, 295 (1929).
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927).
"' Eisler v. U. S., 170 F2d 273 (C.A.D.C. 1948) ; cert. granted, 335 U. S. 857
(1948); dismissed, 338 U. S. 883 (1949).
114McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 155 (1927).
"' Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361, 374-76 (1911); Barsky v. U. S., 167 F2d
241, 251 (C.A.D.C. 1947), cert. den. 334 U. S. 843 (1948).
..U. S. v. Josephson, 165 F2d 82 (C.A., 2d, 1947), cert. den., 333 U. S. 838
(1948); rehearing den. 333 U. S. 858 (1948); rehearing den. 335 U. S. 899
(1948).
II- U. S. v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950) ; rehearing den., 339 U. S. 991 (1950).
1
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attempts to subpoena papers from the Executive branch. One of
the principal obstacles in the path of Congressional investigations
of the Executive branch of the government has always been the
position of the latter that Congress cannot compel it to produce
executive documents if the President deems their production incompatible with the public interest. 11 8 The Legislative branch has
never succeeded in any pitched battle on this subject. At times the
Executive acquiesces in the request, with or without the pressure
of the Legislature's "power of the purse." At other times he stands
fast and accumulates new precedents for succeeding administrations.
The publication of a defamatory letter reflecting on the conduct of an investigation has been held not to constitute contempt. 119
Any open interference with the orderly
procedure of a committee
1 20
hearing can be held to be contempt.
The Congressional investigating power may be challenged
inferentially by civil suit for false imprisonment by a person held
in contempt, 12' or by a writ of habeas corpus
brought to discharge a
122
person held in confinement for contempt.
PROCEDURAL CHANGES

Much has been written on possible changes in the procedure of
Congressional investigating committees. 23 Changes have been proposed by members of Congress themselves 24 as well as by law review writers 125 and others.1 26 One individual went so far as to in"'For
the position of the executive branch see Wolkinson, Demands of
Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, 10 FED. B. J. 103 (1949). Compare the attitude of the legislative branch set forth in Memorandum on Proceedings Involving Contempt of Congress and Its Committees, U. S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Committee print, 80th Congress, 2d Session, January 6,
1947.
"'Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521 (1917).
'"Landis, op. cit. supra note 3.
mKilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880).
'm Marshall v. Gordon,
243 U. S. 521 (1917); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294
U. S. 125 (1935).
11See Garrison, Congressional Investigations: Are They a Threat to Civil
Liberties? 40 A.B.A.J. 125 (February, 1954). The same article appears at 100
Congressional Record A1097 (Daily Edition).
IN See Senator Lucas' S. Con. Res. 2, 95 Cong. Rec. 60 (1949); Representative Buchanan's H. Res. 824, and Representative Holifield's H. Con. Res. 4, all
made in the 81st Congress, 1st Session; Representative Heller's H. Con. Res.
186, 83d Congress, discussed at 100 Cong. Rec. A29 (Daily Edition); and Senators Morse and Lehman's S. Con. Res. 64, 83d Congress. See also U. S. District
Judge Charles E. Wyzanski's proposals at 3 REcoRD OF THE BAR AssocIATion OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 93, reprinted at 94 Cong. Rec. A1547.
"2 See CongressionalInvestigations-Salvationin Self Regulation, 38 GEORG.
L. J. 343, at 363, which sets forth a proposed "Tentative Draft of Suggested Committee Rules."
12OSee the 7 proposals of Dean Erwin N. Griswold of the Harvard Law
School, New York Times, March 25, 1954, p. 20, c. 4, and discussion thereof by
Arthur Krock at p. 28, c. 5. See also statement in behalf of the Bar Association
of the District of Columbia before a special subcommittee of the Rules Committee of the House of Representatives, set forth at 100 Cong. Record A5306 (Daily
Edition), August 3, 1953.
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sert an advertisement in a newspaper noting that a petition was
being circulated urging the Piesident to "use his influence to the
ends that Congressional investigations shall be governed by recognized legal principles and procedures."' 27 It has even been suggested that a committee be established28 to review witnesses' claims
of exemption from giving testimony.'
For an excellent analysis of proposed procedural rules for
committees pending in 1.949, see Meader, Limitations on Congressional Investigations.'29 The author, former counsel of the Senate
War Investigating Committee and presently a member of the
House, contends that no general procedural rules should be enacted.
The hue and cry for procedural changes are caused by the unrestrained conduct of a few legislators who, interested solely in increasing their personal power and notoriety, engage in reckless and
irresponsible headline hunting with wild charges, unfounded accusations, etc. Such persons would probably ignore new procedural
rules even as they now ignore laws of committee jurisdiction and
the standards of fair play and good taste already established by
tradition. The rules would, however, be obeyed by the bulk of the
legislators, and would constitute a serious handicap to the accomplishment of the tasks of Congress.
The legislative process is bigger than any one legislator, and
extreme care should be taken lest changes designed to confine one
demagogue wreak havoc on the entire process.
CONCLUSION

The Congressional investigating power is an essential part of
the legislative process and plays an important role in our tripartite system of government. The power is broad, and necessarily
so. The limitations are few, and necessarily so. Our entire system of
government should not be changed because the actions of a few outrage the public sense of decency. The public's desires should be directed toward its own selected representatives who have it within
their power to restore the legislative investigation to a position of
respect in the community.
We must not lose sight of the importance of the doctrine of
separation of powers in our government. The investigating power
of Congress is, at present, functioning almost exclusively through
committees which are delegated authority by the two houses of
Congress. These committees stand in the place of the Senate and
the House. If the Senate or House itself chose to investigate a particular subject, went into plenary session, and began subpoenaing
witnesses without any public statement as to its objectives, the inappropriateness of interference by the Executive or Judicial branch
" New York Times, February 21, 1954, Sec. 4, p. 6.
'28
Congressional Investigations: A Plan for Legislative Review, 40 A.B.A.J.
191 (March, 1954).
" 47 Mich. L. Rev. 775 (1949).
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at this incubation stage in the legislative process would be apparent.
Later, the Executive might veto the bill which resulted from
the investigation, or the Judiciary might hold the law unconstitutional. It is submitted that neither branch has any legitimate role
to fulfill at the formative stage described above.
Much of the confusion on the subject of the Congressional investigation stems from the fact that many Americans have, erroneously, become convinced that witnesses before hostile committees are "on trial." Therefore, their sense of fair play demands: let
the witness be faced by his accuser, let him have the opportunity
to cross-examine other witnesses, etc. This is no less a perversion
of the function of the legislative investigation than that of the
headline hunting chairman who arouses the justifiable ire of the
public. The investigating power is a part of the fact-finding process
which is essential to intelligent law-making. Stripped of its broad
investigating power, Congress would be unaware of the nation's
needs, and the dangers to its existence. In such event, the America
we know would not long endure.
"It must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a
a degree as the courts.' 8 °
No one is useless in the world who lightens the burden of it
for anyone else.-Charles Dickens.
" Holmes, J., in M.K. and T. Railway v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 270 (1904).

Your contribution to the Colorado Bar Foundation today
will still be promoting a better administration of justice in
Colorado for generations to come. The corpus of funds which
the Foundation acquires cannot be invaded. Name the Colorado Bar Foundation in your Will. Mail your contribution
today to the Colorado Bar Foundation, 702 Midland Savings
Building, Denver 2, Colorado.
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THE INVESTIGATING POWER OF CONGRESS,
ITS SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
THOMAS A. GILLIAM
of the Denver Bar

The accumulated weight of repetition behind such a
phrase as "inherent powers".. is a constant invitation to
think words instead of things. It is imperative, therefore,
to subject it to critical scrutiny. This we have ventured to
do by refusing to regard the word "inherent" as a barrier
to further inquiry. Whence and why do the powers "inhere" which are claimed to "inhere" . . .? Do they "inhere"
in nature ...? Do they "inhere" in our history, so that the
formulated experience of the past embodies them?
FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS'

An anomaly in the American scene is the defenseless position
of a witness before a congressional committee. And often'he is
there, not for informational but denunciatory purposes, while the
safeguards ordinarily available to one denounced are only afforded by such courtesy as the member can muster to veil his purpose. The defenses of pertinency and self-incrimination are unsatisfactory, for one or the other is rarely acceptable to the courts
or to the public. The authority of a House of Congress, however,
to make any general inquiry is a forgotten defense, successful once
in the celebrated case of Kilbourn v. Thompson 2 ; and although that
opinion is often cited by the courts, particularly in its aspect of a
certain "right of privacy" residual in the individual, its recital is
merely introductory to the consolation delivered a victim as he is
administered the coup de grace.
Is not what the courts are saying that there exist congressional tribunals with the power to punish any one for concealing
information, tribunals free from procedural restraint? And a
priori, the power, while deplored, is conceded as being legal; Walter
Lippmann has summed up this concession as "that legalized atrocity.' But is the blame for abuse that of Congress or of the courts?
Has not the citizenry been mesmerized by some vague reassurance
that "rights" will arise, that all things shall come to those who
wait, and that the flowers will crush out the weed? Possibly, however, the "problem is not a question of the 'rights' of a witness but
rather of a lack of power in the House of Congress. If there are
limitations . . ., they would seem to stem primarily from the nature
'Frankfurter

and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal

Contcmpts in "Inferior Federal Courts-A Study in
H.\Rv. LAW REV. 1010, 1022-23

(1924).

2-103 U. -S.168, 26 L. Ed. 377 (1880).
'LIPPmANN,

PUBLIC OPINION, 289

(1922).

Separation of Powers, 37
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and from the functions for which it may be
'of the power itself
'4
properly used."
It is suggested that power is often viewed in the rosy hue of
its purpose, whether it be the equitable rule of justice or the enactment of informed legislation. And while, of course, effective authority is often necessary to achieve great ends, provided in a
democracy there are adequate checks upon the process, it would
appear that Congress, on the ground of "inherency", has worked
loose of the fabric and structure of our democratic system and
stands apart, wielding such authority arbitrarily. Some reexamination would therefore seem necessary, in order to discover the
missing link that has fathered the abnormality.
There has been no little reaction to the use of such power. In
1788 the assertion by Pennsylvania judges in Respublica v. Oswald5 of their right to attach for a contempt committed out of the
presence of the Court, provoked the General Assembly of that state
to convene with the view of impeachment. The impeachment
was defeated by an appeal of a member as to social purposes
which summary power with proper self-restraint is used, and that
"without this power the legislature itself would be exposed to wanton insult and interruption." And thus were the judges spared impeachment. This acknowledgement of the similarity of the power
as used by the legislature and the courts, however, blushed unseen
in Pennsylvania, for Congress, while vesting the courts, by the
Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, 7 with jurisdiction to punish
all contempts of their authority, did not see fit to legislate as for its
own power. It was provided merely, in the Act of May 3, 1798, that
oaths or affirmations might be administered to witnesses by certain legislative officials "in any case under their examination." It
thus seems odd that Congress felt it necessary to enact legislation
granting the courts such judicial power, but apparently did not
perceive the necessity of granting similar privilege to either of its
Houses. This is even more extraordinary in view of the comment
of Chief Justice Marshall in Ex parte Bollman,9 decided in 1807,
on the necessity of the enactment of habeas corpus legislation by
Congress:
...they must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great
constitutional privilege should receive life and activity;
for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself
would be lost ... 10

Liacos, Rights of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees, 33 BosToN
U. LAW REv. 337, 347 (1953).
'1 U. S. 319, 1 Dall. 319, 1 L. Ed. 155.
OId. at 329c.
1 Stat. at L. 83.
Id. at 554.
8 U. S. 75, 4 Cranch 75, 2 L. Ed. 554.
'Old. at 95.
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Possibly an explanation of why the legislators felt their own
contempt legislation unnecessary is the force of English precedent.
In Burdett v. Abbott," decided in 1811 and involving the discipline
of a member of Commons, Lord Ellenborough, Chief Justice, acknowledged this assemblage to be a part of a High Court: "The
privileges which belong to them seem at all times to have been, and
necessarily must be, inherent in them, independent of any precedent.' 1 2 Justice Bayley concurred, apparently perceiving that this
did not perhaps explain the independent authority of that branch
of Parliament, and cited the Institutes of Lord Coke that Commons
was also a court with attendant judicial powers.' 3 The statement of
the Chief Justice, however, was from an age of natural law, and
this doctrine in America at the time had its strong proponents. Indeed the Supreme Court apparently thought certain powers adhered by necessity to the courts, even though Congress had enacted the Judiciary Act, for in 1812 Justice Johnson said in United
States v. Hudson:
• . . To fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy,
enforce the observance of order, etc., are powers which
cannot be dispensed with in a court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others: and so far our courts,
no doubt, possess powers not immediately derived from

statute

. ..

The only action which the legislators took with regard to their
own similarly assumed powers was to enlarge in 1817 the legislation of 1798 to include the chairman of a standing committee. 15 Apparently Congress felt, as did the courts of law, that it had implied
powers not immediately derived from statute, despite Article I,
Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution, which gives Congress authority: "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." True, Marshall
in MeCulloch v. Maryland noted in 1819 that this is placed among
the constitutional powers and not among the limitations,' 6 and that
the "result of the most careful and attentive consideration bestowed upon this clause is, that if it does not enlarge, it cannot be

construed to restrain the powers of Congress

. . .117

This famous

statement, in view of Ex parte Bollman, supra, cannot stand for
the proposition that constitutional powers are self-executing.
The first great case, however, sustaining the inherency of the
power in a branch of Congress was Anderson v. Dunn, decided in
11 14

East's Rep. 1.

12Id. at 136.
IS Id. at 159.

Cranch 32, 3 L. Ed. 259.
(February 8, 1817).
17 U. S. 316, 419, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
Id. at 420.

1411 U. S. 32, 34, 7
153 Stat. at L. 345
'7
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1821. Here again Justice Johnson, in support of his opinion, reiterated his position taken in United States v. Hudson, supra:
It is true, that the courts of justice of the United
States are vested, by express statute provision, with power
to fine and imprison for contempts; but it does not follow,
from this circumstance, that they would not have exercised that power, without the aid of the statute . . .; on
the contrary, it is a legislative assertion of this right, as
incidental to a grant of judicial power, and can only be
considered, only as an instance of abundant caution ...
The Court declared that of necessity similar power existed as to
contempts outside the presence of the House of Representatives
as well as before it; but, since American legislative bodies never
possessed the omnipotence of the legislative assembly of Great
Britain, it was "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed."' 19
Despite, however, the assertions of Justice Johnson as to inherency of the power of contempt to a grant of judicial power,
District Judge Peck, ten years later, almost got impeached in Congress for an unpopular use of such authority, although sustained
by English precedent*a While impeachment failed, Congress, by
the Act of March 2, 1831, changed the Judiciary Act to provide
that the power of the federal courts "shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any person ... in the
presence of the said court; or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice ...-21 Thus Congress enacted rather definitive legislation for the courts, but not for its own use of the power,
unless, of course, a branch of the legislature is itself a court.
The English cases of the time are not very clear on this. In
Stockdale v. Hansard,a libel case decided in 1839, the defense was
that the libel was included in House of Commons proceedings, the
publication of which had been privileged by resolution.2 2 The plaintiff urged that privilege correctly applied to the whole Parliament
and not to each separate branch, for each House might make contradictory declarations of law, and each declaration would equally
be the lex parliamenti.23 The Attorney General urged privilege
established by necessity, usage, and acquiescence. 24 Lord Denham,
C. J., however, accepted the plaintiff's argument 25 ; but in doing so
he was faced with the previous decision of the Court in Burdette v.
Abbott, supra. The method of avoiding that decision was to treat
Is19 U. S. 204, 227, 6 Wheat. 204, 5 L. Ed. 242.
11Id. at 231. Thus, the punishment of a private citizen, who had attempted
to bribe a member, was affirmed.
20 STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK (1833).
4 Stat. at L. 487.
112 Eng. Rep. F. R. 1112, 1115, 9 Ad. & Ell. 1.
"Ibid.
Id. at 1145.
"Id. at 1153.
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the contempt power as being a very special privilege, a creature of
necessity apparently, rather than of statute:
The decision manifestly rests on the privilege to
punish for contempt, inherent no doubt in Parliament and
in each House ... but which it only possesses in common
with the Courts of Justice...26
He denounced as a "notion", nevertheless, the argument that
if the House alone were not a superior court answerable to none
other, then it was a special court whose adjudications were final;
and said, even if this were the case, the question of jurisdiction
would still arise.27 Thus the Court did not quite follow the CokeBayley thesis 28 that the House of Commons also was a court; but,
even so, gave the contempt power of Commons an unexplained position of inherency, supported by a further concession, again for
which no authority is cited:
The Commons of England are not invested with more
of power and dignity by their legislative character than by
2
that which they bear as the grand inquest of the nation. (Italics supplied.)
In 1845 Lord Coleridge, in Howard v. Gosset, repeated this
dicta, identifying the source, as follows:
That the Commons are, in the words of Lord Coke,
the general inquisitors of the realm, I fully admit: it
would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of their injury can be bounded ... ..0
Thus, the House of Representatives, although admonished that
it had not inherited the power of Commons by Anderson v. Dunn,
supra, was reassured that it had inherited at least some of this "inherent" power, a power that was inherent, according to the several
English judges, because the House of Commons was: a part of a
High Court, a court, or the grand inquest of the realm. Congress,
however, in 1857 did grant the courts jurisdiction over the offense
of contumacy to its committees.:" It was provided that a witness,
who should wilfully default or should refuse to answer any pertinent question, would, in addition to existing penalties, be subject
to indictment; and secondly, that no person should be excused on
the ground that to answer might tend to incriminate or disgrace
him, but that such witness would not be subjected to any penalty,
: Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1168.
" See Bayley, in Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East's Rep. 1, 159.
-9Denham, Stockdale v. Hinsard, 112 Eng. Rep. F. R. 1112, at 1156. The
Court held, nevertheless, that privileges could not be created by resolution, and
the following year, Parliament enacted remedial legislation, 3 & 4 Vict., c. 9.
:'10 Q.B. 359, 379-80. See also Gosset v. Howard,- 10 Q.B. 411, 450-51 (1847).
11 Stat. at L. 155 (January 24, 1857).
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excepting perjury committed while testifying. 32 There followed
two trials in the Senate, in which that body given an inch by Anderson v. Dunn, supra, took a mile.
The first was the trial of a "Contumacious Witness" in 1860,
with Senator Sumner asking to consider the nature of the power:
... The inquiry which it institutes is clearly judicial
in character; without, however, any judicial purpose, or
looking to any judicial end. The committee is essentially a
tribunal, with power of denunciation . . .33
Senator Crittenden, however, not without interruption, defended
the power:
• . . The Constitution says . . . all powers that are
necessary and proper for carrying these specified powers
into effect are hereby granted.
Mr. HALE. I beg pardon. There is no such clause in
the Constitution.
Mr. FESSENDEN. Power is given to pass laws for
that purpose.
Mr. CRITTENDEN. You may pass all laws that are
necessary and proper for carrying the specified powers
into execution.
Mr. HALE. Exactly.
Mr. .SUMNER. That, I understand, is the point here
-that there is no law.
Senator Crittenden answered with a question:
...I come now to a question where the cooperation
of the two branches is not necessary. There are some
things that the Senate may do. How? According to a mode
of its own. Are we to ask the other branch of the Legislature to concede by law to us the power of making such
an inquiry .. .?
but then, he conceded rather abruptly:
The Constitution has given us no right to institute
this particular inquiry. Some say it has not, by any fair
interpretation, given us the power. The Senate has decided
that point. . .34
3

Id. at 156. This immunity, however, was partially withdrawn, 12 Stat. at

L. 333 (January 24, 1862); and, thus probably afforded the defense of selfincrimination. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 12 S. Ct. 195, a5
L. Ed. 1110 (1892). The statutory provision is now 18 U.S.C.A. 3486.
31 Cong. Globe, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., 1100. Sumner listed, in addition
to impeachment, judging elections and qualifications of members, and punishing
them for disorderly behavior, two other cases of the use of the power under the
heading, self-protection: (1) the purloining and publishing of a treaty (see Ex
parte Nugent, Fed. Case No. 10,375, 18 Fed. Cases 471, C.C.D.C. 1848), and (2)
inquiries into the conduct of servants of the legislature.
"Id. at 1105. Senator Pearce resolved the argument by suggesting the
"recognition" given by existing legislation sufficed, id. at 1106.
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Then in 1868, there took place the second trial, the only instructive excerpts from which are, as follows:
The Chief Justice. The Sergeant-at-arms will open the court
by proclamation.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

OPENING ARGUMENT OF MR. BUTLER, OF MASSACHUSETTS, ONE OF THE MANAGERS ON THE IMPEACHMENT OF THE PRESIDENT.
Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Senate:
All investigations of fact are in some
but not in the sense in which the word is used
If this body here is a Court in any manner
agree that many if not all the analogies
cedures of courts must obtain ... 3

sense trials,
by courts...
. ., then we
of the pro-

Mr. Butler concluded, however:
...we are in the presence of the Senate of the United
States ... You are a law unto yourselves...36
It was after these events that Justice Miller rendered his
opinion of 1880 in Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra. This opinion discusses English cases, saying that, while they are in very little
agreement as to the extent of the power, there is little difference as
to its origin, that is to say, when authority centered in a single
court of Parliament. 7 Whether or not it was necessary, however,
for Congress to have inherited such power in aid of legislation,
Justice Miller found, for the immediate case, no occasion to decide.3 8 He enumerated, nevertheless, certain extra-legislative functions granted in the Constitution to a House of Congress: to discipline its members, to judge their qualifications, the particular role
of either House in impeachment; and, as to these, he conceded,
answers might be compelled to proper questions in the same manner and by the same means as courts. Beyond this, Justice Miller
coldly remarked that he was sure that neither House possessed the
general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of citizens. The reason assigned was the doctrine of separation of
powers.3 9 The Court, however, was faced with the decision of
Anderson v. Dunn, supra. "Some of the reasoning" (presumably
not that to the effect that courts inherently possess the contempt
power) of Justice Johnson was overruled, principally the implication that there is, in each House of Congress, a general power of
15TRIAL oF ANDREW JOHNSON, 3 vols. (Gov't Printing Office 1868), Vol. 1,
87, 89.
Id. at 90.
81Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 183. Also cited, id. at 187-9: Kielley
v. Carson, 4 Moo. P. C. 63 (1841), that the investigatory power was not necessarily incident to the legislative function.
1id. at 189.
Old. at 190.
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punishing for contempt. 40 That Stockdale v. Hansard, supra, was
used to overrule this implication is somewhat amazing, but perhaps
Justice Johnson was misled by the headnotes. In any event, he reof members of Congress in the role of grand
fused to conceive
41
inquisitors.
That Congress had not the general power of inquiry was unfavorably received, however. Woodrow Wilson wrote in 1884:
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look
diligently into every affair of government and to talk
...
much about what it sees . . . The. informing function
42
should be preferred even to its legislative function.
The difficulty with this is, that there is more in the Constitution to sustain the existence of this function in the executive,
rather than in the legislative department. The informing function
is provided for in Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit,
that the President "shall from time to time give to the Congress
information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." The precedent and necessity arguments might therefore
be used as an apologia for executive use of judicial powers, sufficiently broad as the informing function implies. Perhaps, however, the Supreme Court would find occasion to interfere, despite
the power of that department, as it has occasionally interfered
with the legislative, despite the power of that body.
This is not to say that Congress is unable to create an adequately staffed executive commission to aid in its joint function of
legislation. This was established in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, wherein it was said in 1894:
...All must recognize the fact that the full information necessary as a basis of intelligent legislation by Conothergress from time to time ... cannot be obtained ....
41 Id. at 196-200.
And see headnote 10, id. at 169. Justice Miller subsequently
had occasion in United States v. Ambrose, 108 U. S. 336, 341, 2 S. Ct. 682, 27 L.
Ed. 746 (1883), to avoid an attack on the courts' use of implied powers; United
States v. Ambrose (Cir. Ct. S.D., Ohio, 1880), 2 Fed. 556, 557.
4 "The public
has been much abused, the time of legislative bodies uselessly consumed and the rights of the citizen ruthlessly invaded under that now
familiar pretext of legislative investigation . . . Courts and grand juries are
the only inquisitions into crime in this country. I do not recognize that Congress is the grand inquest of the nation." Justice Miller as cited by TOURTELLOT,
THE ANATOMY OF AmERICAN POLITICS, 103 (1950).
1941 the Attorney
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT, 303 (1885). In
4WILSON,
General rendered an opinion, 40 Op. A.G. 45, which, in view of the reluctance
of the courts to interfere in political matters, partially closed the doors of the
Government to inquiry, if the executive feels such information would be against
the public interest, id. at 49. Impeachment, of course, remains a weapon of
Congress.

DICTA

August, 1954

wise than through the instrumentality of an administrative body . . .43
The Court goes on to say that such an agency could not, under
the American system, be vested with authority to compel obedience
to its orders by fine or imprisonment. The decision, however, recognizes that the House of Congress, in those exceptional instances
enumerated in Kilbourn v. Thompson "and in cases that may involve the existence of those bodies," does have such power. 44 Thus
the power of congressional committees, as created by resolution,
was again somewhat narrowly confined, at least for the moment.
In re Chapman,however, was decided in 1897. In that case the
Supreme Court upheld as constitutional the legislation of 1857;4:
and while it involved an investigation by the Senate of certain of
its members, the Court used some rather general language:
... We grant that Congress could not divest itself, or
either of its Houses, of the essential and inherent power
to punish for contempt,

but adds:
in cases to which the power of either House properly

extended

. . .46

Obviously, this latter phrase was intended by the Court to mean
the instances enumerated in Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Brimson, supra. The Court was concerned with the specific
exercise of the power by a single House and not with the abstract
proposition of the implied power of Congress to investigate in aid
of its legislative function.
Indeed, to suggest that the House of Representatives could utilize
the power even in connection with a possible impeachment, was to
the Supreme Court of the time, lese majesty. The suggestion was
made in Marshall v. Gordon, decided in 1917, and Chief Justice
White toyed with the idea and opined that such deviation would:
(1) for the House, be an Icarian role, (2) overrule In re Chapman,
(3) be subject to constitutional limitations. 47 That there were no
limitations on any exercise of the implied power by the courts,
White, however, was equally certain; for the following year in
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, a contempt of court case,
he affirmed, under similar facts, the punishment of a contemnor,
despite the Act enacted just after the Peck impeachment trial in
- 154 U. S. 447, 474, 14 S. Ct. 1125, 38 L. Ed. 1047. For Commonwealth use
see Finpr, Congressional Investigations: The British System. 18 U. CHi. LAW
REV. 421, 521 (1951).
44I.C.C. v. Brimson, supra note 43 at 485; see also Sumner's enumeration,
Cong. Globe, 36th Cong. 1st Sess., 1100.
4Act of January 24, 1857, 11 Stat. at L. 155.
166 U. S. 661, 671-72, 17 S. Ct. 677, 41 L. Ed. 1154.
4T243 U. S. 521, 547-48, 37 S. Ct. 448, 61 L. Ed. 881; these limitations are
identifiable as being those found in the Sixth Amendment, cf. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, note 48, post.
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1831.48 The Toledo case evoked criticism in 1924 from Professors
Frankfurter
and Landis, as to the concept of inherent power in
49
the courts.

Various scholars, however, were myopic to the legislative use
of the power, a half-brother, whose same ugliness,' although perceived, was felt endurable. Frankfurter justified the ugliness on
the Wilsonian ground. 50 C. S. Potts took care after the decision in
1924 of Ex parte Daugherty5' by a federal district court to the effect that the Teapot Dome investigation was an extra-judicial attempt by the Senate to try the former Attorney General at the bar
of public opinion, not to criticize this decision, but to attack Kilbourn v. Thompson, the source of theory that the power of a single
House of Congress was in any way limited. Potts urged that Lord
Coke and the English decisions which quoted his Institutes are
doubtful authority for the proposition (which he said was adopted
by Justice Miller) that the House of Commons was a court, in that
the Institutes were yet another means used by Coke to assert the
supremacy of Commons. 52 Professor Landis also directed his attack against Justice Miller (Landis mistakenly citing Potts that
the "assertion that Parliament was a judicial body is in itself one
that scholars have vigorously denied" 5 ), professing failure to
understand how Miller overlooked the conclusion, "not only one of
history but also one of law," i.e., Coleridge, in Howard v. Gosset,
54
supra, citing Coke that the House of Commons is a grand inquest.
Professor Landis then went on to list examples wherein a
single branch of a legislature had exercised investigatory powers.
While the position is doubtful that a prescriptive right may be obtained by a House of Congress in a constitutional power, the Supreme Court, nevertheless, in McGrain v. Daugherty,55 the decision
that overruled in 1927 Ex parte Daugherty, supra, did rely on
American legislative precedent. Cited from history was the trial
48247
U. S. 402, 38 S. Ct. 560, 62 L. Ed. 1186; Act of March 2, 1831, 4
Stat. at L. 487.
"Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra, note 1.
5"Hands off the Investigations, 38 NEW REPUBLIC 329, 330 (1924); and see
Wilson, op. cit. supra, note 42.
1299 F. 620 (S.D., Ohio, W.D.).
52 Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Pitnish for Contempt, 74 U. PA.
LAW REV. 691, 692-95 (1926).
"Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. LAW REV. 153, 159 (1926). Cf. HASKINS, ENGLISH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1948),
at p. 13: ". . . the king's parliament in the
opening days of the fourteenth century is more in the nature of a high court
of justice than a deliberative or legisative assembly. For it is the council, with
the king as presiding officer, which is the heart and core of the medieval parliament-a council of ministers, judges, and experts in the law."
"Landis, op. cit. supra, note 53 at 164, and see Howard v. Gosset, 10 Q.B.
411.
"273 U. S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L. Ed. 580. One Canadian case is cited, Ex
parte Dansereau (1875) 19 L. C. Jur. 210, id. at 166-67. That decision, in that
the North America Act intervened, doesn't conflict with Kielley v. Carson, 4
Moo. P. C. 63 (1841).
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of the Contumacious Witness, supra, the debate over which resolved the fact that congressional "recognition" of the power sufficed,6 and that James Madison, a constitutional draftsman, voted,
as a member of Congress in 1792, for an inquiry into the St. Clair
Expedition. Madison, however, also became Secretary of State, and
Marshall presumably was not impressed, if the argument was made
in Marbury v. Madison,57 that Madison was arbiter legis constitutionalis. Cited also were the generalities of Anderson v. Dunn,
supra, and Kilbourn v. Thompson, which was not overruled.58 The
language of In re Chapman, supra, as to the "inherency" of the
power to aid "constitutional" and "legitimate functions" was also
used, even while it was acknowledged that such language was
probably not intended to include the legislative function.59 There
followed an analysis of Marshall v. Gordon, supra, somewhat inharmonious with the immediate opinion, and of several state cases,
somewhat inharmonious with the Marshallcase. 0
Despite the insistence of the Court in McGrain v. Daugherty
that the power of inquiry not only was incident to the legislative
function, but also that the incident needed for its sanction apparently, mere recognition by Congress rather than specific legislation
therefor, the problem of the powers of a committee and of a single
House of Congress continued to haunt the Supreme Court. In 1928
Reed v. County Commissioners1 was decided. There, a Senate committee sought, through district court process, certain ballots and
boxes, in connection with a review of the election of a senator. The
committee claimed that the court could, under the Judicial Code,
56

Id. at 162-64. See argument of Senator Pearce, Cong. Globe, 36th Cong.

1st Sess., 1100.
5 U. S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 I Ed. 60 (1803).
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 168-171, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L. Ed. 580.
Id. at 171-73.
Id. at 173. Citing Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, is as complex as failing to overrule Kilbourn v. Thompson. Possibly the Court failed to perceive the
inconsistency in that these cases did not conflict with its awareness that the
courts were using this same power without authorization. Perhaps also, Justice
Miller can be criticized on this ground, and not that which Landis chose: that
the Houses of Congress possessed the power "incidentally," while the courts
apparently did not. Cf. Morgan, Congressional Investigations and Judicial Review-Kilbourn v. Thompson Revisited, 37 CA r. LAW REv. 556 (1949). State
cases cited in McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 165-66, were: Burnham v.
Morrissey, 14 Gray 226 (Mass. 1859), wherein it was held that the courts could
review the proceedings of a single house in that it was merely a branch of the
legislature; thus, taking up the "notion" rejected in Stockdale v. Hansard, 112
Eng. Rep. F. L 1112 at 1168; Wilekens v. Willet, 40 N. Y. (1 Keyes) 521 (1864),
which contains an admirable summation as to the nature of the power: ".... In
the earlier history of the country from which our institutions, both of law and
legislation are principally derived, judicial and legislative functions existed in
and were exercised by the same body. And when they were afterwards separated . . ., the legislative body necessarily retained a sufficient amount of the
judicial power to enable it to investigate . . ."; and People v. Keeler, 99 N. Y.
463, 2 N.E. 615, 624-25 (1885), also to the effect that the power is judicial.
Reed v. County Com'rs. of Delaware County, Pa., 277 U. S. 376, 48 S. Ct.
531, 72 I Ed. 924.
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take jurisdiction in any civil action brought by authorized governmental agents. The Court, however, questioned whether "the Senate
alone may give that authority" 62 (even in matter of peculiar concern to it), but was able to avoid the question by finding that the
Senate resolution had not authorized the action. The following year
in Barry v. United States, another Senate election investigation,
the Court indicated that the judicial power of the Senate in such
matters, at least before its own bar, was very strong, "beyond the
authority of any other tribunal to review", 63 adding, however, a
postscript:
• . . if judicial interference can be successfully invoked, it can only be upon a clear showing of... a denial
of due process...64
The Supreme Court was not so ambivalent as to the power of
the courts, despite statutory interference, for also in 1929, it decided Sinclair v. United States, a contempt of court case, and said:
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States . . ., adjudged
the company guilty of contempt by publishing, in the city
where the court was sitting, articles concerning a pending
equity case. Counsel there maintained that it was not ...
found that any of the publications was . . .read by the
judge and, therefore, he lacked power to punish under
section 268, Judicial Code... Replying this court, through
Mr. Chief Justice White, said:
Clarified by the matters expounded and the ruling
made in the Marshall Case [Marshall v. Gordon . . .],
there can be no doubt the provision [section 268] conferred no power not already granted and imposed no limitatations not already existing ...65
In short, the Court that handed down McGrain v. Daugherty,
supra, and Sinclair v. United States, 66 also a congressional contempt case arising out of the Teapot Dome investigation, felt that
there existed in the courts and, to a less degree, in Congress an inherent power to punish for contempt within the limits of common
law, but not within the limits of the Constitution, except possibly
the necessity of legislation recognizing the power; legislation which,
however, could impose no limitations. So also in Jurney v. MacCracken, involving an investigation of certain senators and de"Id. at 388. The statute now reads: "expressly authorized to sue by Act of
Congress," 28 U.S.C.A. 1345.
- Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U. S. 597, 613, 49 S. Ct.
452, 73 L. Ed. 867.
Id. at 620.
279 U. S. 749, 763, 49 S. Ct. 471, 73 L. Ed. 938.
-6279 U. S. 263, 49 S. Ct. 268, 73 L. Ed. 692 (1929). This case, by its emphasis that the Teapot Dome investigation was initiated under joint resolution
and involved the public domain, see Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution, seems to be saying that such might be the sole concern of Congress.
Other clauses, however, contain similar wording.
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cided in 1935 as to a direct contempt proceeding in the Senate
rather than statutory resort to the courts, the Supreme Court reiterated that the 1857 statute did not impair congressional contempt
power.6 7 And likewise in Seymour v. United States, a circuit court
held in 1935 that not only was legislation ineffective as to such implied power, but also Congress could not "limit the future exercise of that constitutional power." 68
If this ruling is correct, the abuses of use of inherent power
were beyond the power of Congress to correct by legislation. It
must be observed, however, that the matter before the court in
Seymour v. United States was an investigation by the Senate of the
campaign expenses of its members. This would seem to be within
the sole jurisdiction of that body and quite obviously, were legislation passed controlling such an investigation, this would conflict
with Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of the Constitution, that "Each
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings." Legislation in
this instance, and other similar instances stated in Kilbourn v.
Thompson, would impose the will of the other House, the President,
and the courts upon matters which the Constitution made the sole
concern of a single branch of Congress. So also is impeachment a
matter for the determination of the Senate. Indeed, in Ritter v.
United States, a Court of Claims case decided in 1936 and arising
out of the impeachment of a federal judge, that court was of the
opinion that the Senate should act without any other tribunal having "anything to do with the case. ' 69 The state cases relied upon by
the court did not, however, sustain its conclusion that inquiry as to
70
jurisdiction is forbidden.
" 294 U. S. 125, 55 S. Ct. 375, 79 L. Ed. 802. Justice Brandeis cited, id. at
149, Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U. S. 204, in support of his opinion that a House of
Congress has an essential privilege to punish a private citizen's attempt to
bribe a member and said that the Marshall case "must be read in the light of
the particular facts." For the facts see Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 530-32.
Under these facts, where the contempt was incurred not only in a newspaper
article, but also, as compared to Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247
U. S. 402, before the congressional tribunal, Brandeis apparently felt the slanderous attacks were justified:
'877 F. 2d 577, 579 (C.C.A. 8th).
-84 Ct. Cl. 293, 296, cert. denied 300 U. S. 668, 57 S. Ct. 513, 81 L. Ed. 875
(1937).
"oId. at 297-98: State ex rel. Trapp v. Chambers, 96 Okla. 78, 220 Pac. 890
(1923), wherein it was held that, since impeachment was undefined by the
state constitution, the legislature might suspend a governor, pendente lite, a
ruling hardly compatible with Article II, Section 4 of the Federal Constitution
that civil officers shall be removed on conviction; Ferguson v. Maddox, 114
Texas 85, 263 S.W. 888, 893 (1924), wherein it was said: "The courts, in proper
cases, may always inquire whether any department of the government has
acted outside of and beyond its constitutional authority. The acts of the Senate,
sitting as court of impeachment, are not exempt . . ."; Ferguson v. Wilcox
119 Tex. 280, 28 S.W. 2d 526, 533 (1930), to the same effect; and People ex rel.
Robin v. Hayes, 82 Misc. 165, 143 N. Y. Supp. 325, 330 (1913), where it was said
re the duty of a court with reference to collateral inquiry as to impeachment
proceedings: "It has no jurisdiction to inquire into the sufficiency of charges
... nor, I take it, whether the proceedings . . . were properly conducted, unless
. . . constitutional guaranties are . . . ignored."
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It therefore appears that the Senate and the House are almost
beyond the reach of the courts in matters of their express jurisdiction. But the question arises: Is there not jurisdiction in the courts
when Congress acts under the implied power of inquiry in aid of
legislation? Is not this implied power a matter of some concern to
the executive and the judicial branches of- government; i.e., if legislation itself is subject to a system of checks and balances, is not an
implied power in aid thereof, subject to the same system? Whenever Congress has delegated such power, the courts have always
required that the executive agency designated to carry out that inquiry, act within standards and afford fair rules of procedure, although not necessarily judicial.71 If the investigatory power of Congress on matters, the subject of legislation, is viewed as "inherent,"
however, albeit implied, it is indeed not only above the requirement of fair play, but also beyond the power of Congress to limit
it. So also until 1941, the courts felt that their "inherent" power of
contempt was beyond the control of Congress despite the legislation of 1831. One hundred and ten years elapsed between that legislation and Nye v. United States, a decision largely based upon the
article in which Frankfurter and Landis had questioned the inherency of power. 72 The Supreme Court in that case spoke as follows:
In 1918 this Court in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States ....
stated that "there can be no doubt" that ...
the Act of March 2, 1831 "conferred no power not already
granted and imposed no limitations not already existing";
and that it was "intended to prevent the danger by
reminiscense of what had gone before of attempts to
exercise a power not possessed which . . . had been sometimes done in the exercise of legislative power." The inaccuracy of that
historic observation has been plainly
73
demonstrated.
Thus was overruled the concept of "inherency" of the power of
the courts, and thus was removed an obstacle to the' courts' obvious inclination to limit the "incidental" power of Houses of Congress in matters beyond their singular jurisdiction. The hero, who
was also the villain of the piece, was Dean Landis, who, with Justice Frankfurter, broke the power in the courts with their article
71 In Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 14-15, 58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L
Ed.
1129 (1938), Chief Justice Hughes said: "The first question goes to the very
foundation of the action of administrative agencies intrusted by the Congress
with broad control over activities which in their detail cannot be dealt with
directly by the Legislature. The vast expansion of this field . . . is made
possible under our system by adherence to the basic principles that the Legislature shall appropriately determine the standards of administrative action and
that in administrative proceedings of a quasijudicial character the liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play."
"Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra, note 1.
313 U. S. 33, 47, 61 S. Ct. 810, 85 L. Ed. 1172.
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in 1924,74 and subsequently enhanced the power in the Congress. " ,
While the power of inquiry may exist in Congress as an aid to legislation, it would seem that no committee thereof possesses this
power without its delegation from Congress. Mere "recognition"
would seem not enough. It became timely, therefore, 76in 1941 for
McGrain v. Daugherty to be abandoned, as was Toledo.
It became more timely for Congress to legislate into being fair
play for its witnesses. And while Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 implies a limitation on a limitation, even here, judicial inquiry is not
foreclosed. For ours is not only a government of laws but also of
men, whose motives must be scrutinized. And even our great decisions are also literature, subject to review.

SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS IN
URANIUM MINING LAW*
E. B. ADAMS
of the Grand Junction Bar

The problems of uranium mining law undoubtedly began to
arise on September 13, 1945 when President Truman responded to
the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki by an Executive Order
which withdrew from entry all public lands which contained what
he termed radio active minerals. This order remained in effect until
the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of August 1, 1946. Uranium claims were located during that period but, so far as I know,
the Bureau of Land Management has had no occasion to pass upon
their validity.
In this area the lawyers are primarily concerned with the legal
steps to be taken in locating and acquiring a valid possessory title
to a mining claim containing, or thought to contain, deposits of
uranium bearing ores which may be mined and sold at a profit.
While it may be said to be academic at the present time, due fo
the interpretations placed upon the Atomic Energy Act by the
Atomic Energy Commission, I imagine a Court would deliberate
for some time if the question were properly raised, in whom the
legal title rests to uranium ores mined from claims located upon
the Public Domain subsequent to August 1, 1946.
Sub Section 5 (b) (7) Atomic Energy Act reads in part:
All Uranium, thorium and all other metals determined
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection to be peculiarly essential to the production of fissionable material
contained in whatever concentration in deposits in the
7 Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. supra, note 1.
See Landis, op. cit. supra, note 53, and Franfurter in United States v.
Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 73 S. Ct. 543, 97 L. Ed. 770 (1953).
" Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402.
*This is an adaptation of a speech made by Mr. Adams in Grand Junction
on June 1, 1954.
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public lands are hereby reserved for use of the United
States, subject to valid claims, rights or privileges existon the date of the enactment of this Act.
This is immediately followed by the prohibition that no one
who had taken any part in the atomic bomb project and had acquired any confidential information as to the location of fissionable materials could benefit, subsequent to its enactment, through
any location, entry or settlement.
Attorney Clare M. Senior, Salt Lake City, eminent as a mining lawyer, has publicly stated that:
The Interior Department appears to have interpreted
the Atomic Energy Act of August 1, 1946 (60 Stat. 755;
42 U.S.C. 1801) and particularly Section 5 (b) (7) thereof (42 U.S.C. 1805 (b) (7) ) as precluding the location
after August 1, 1946 of a mining claim for fissionable
source materials (Departmental Decision, Lesse C. Clark,
January 14, 1947, Motion for Rehearing denied February
19, 1947; Memorandum of May 13, 1947 from the Chief
Counsel of the Bureau of Land Management to the Director of such Bureau; 43 C.F.R. 102.43).
The Atomic Energy Commission, to which is entrusted the administration of said Atomic Energy Act,
does not appear, in its administration, to have shared said
view of the Bureau of Land Management (Domestic
Uranium Program Circular 7-10 C.F.R. 60.7). The Congressional Record and Committee Reports in relation to
the consideration of the herein mentioned Public Law No.
250, which was approved August 12, 1953, do not indicate that Congress shared said Bureau of Land Management interpretation. Most operations which are being
presently conducted for the mining of uranium are under
mining locations located subsequent to August 1, 1946.
It is to be noted that on page 47 of the booklet published
in 1949 by the Atomic Energy Commission and the United States
Geological Survey that:
It is the view of the Atomic Energy Commission and
the Department of the Interior, however, that this provision does not prevent the staking of a valid claim as a result of the discovery of uranium or thorium, and generally
not prevent the locator from mining or selling the ore.
The word "generally" is an adjective of degree, and the exceptions which might prevent a miner from mining or selling the
ore must remain in the mind of the official who wrote the words.
It is said, on pages 48 and 49 of the booklet, under the title of
"Government Rights and Powers" that:
Because of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act,
the Government keeps certain rights in uranium or thor-
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ium ores located on public lands after August 1, 1946. The
most important of these is the right of the Atomic Energy
Commission to enter on the land subject to the location
and remove the uranium or thorium ore. If this right of
entry is used, the Commission is required by law to compensate the locator for the damage or injury caused by its
action, although not for the uranium or thorium which is
removed. For example, in the case of a carnotite deposit,
the Commission would be required to pay the claim holder
for the vanadium which would be removed along with the
uranium, but not for the uranium content of the ore. This
right of the Commission to enter and remove ores which
contain uranium or thorium protects the Government
from, among other things, a claimholder's refusal to work
a deposit.
Under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, the
Atomic Energy Commission may also, if it considers it
necessary, require the delivery to the Commission of uranium or thorium, located on public lands after August 1,
1946, after the metal has been mined and separated. If the
Commission exercises this power, it must pay the reasonable value of their services, including a profit, to those
persons found by the Commission to have performed
services in the discovery, mining and extraction of the
metal. It does not have to pay for the uranium or thorium.
Up to the present time, the Commission has not
thought it desirable or necessary to exercise either of these
rights, and it will not be the policy of the Commission to
exercise them except in case of emergency where no other
course of action is practicable. It is not expected that such
an occasion is likely to arise.
In Utah the State Land Board has issued a large number of
uranium-vanadium leases upon its school lands. The State Land
Board of Colorado is just beginning to do so. What title does the
State possess in the uranium?
It is said in C.J.S. under Public Lands that:
As a rule, a grant to a state of certain designated
sections for school purposes, does not include mineral
rights known to be such at the time the survey is approved;
...
but if the mineral character of the land is not known
at the time of the survey, tile passes to the State.
We also have the problem of the locator desiring to locate a
uranium claim on patented lands where coal and all other minerals
are reserved to the United States under the Act of December 29,
1916.
The right of the prospector to initiate a mining location is
clarified in the Colorado case of McMulin v. Magnuson, 102 Colo.
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230, such interpretation being followed in the Wyoming case reported in 189 P. 2d 692.
One of our members is shortly to commence a Quiet Title action in Grand County, Utah, to quiet title to uranium ores in patented lands with no mineral reservations to the United States but
where the fee owner has given oil and gas leases covering all of
the oil and gas and other minerals.
There may be some head scratching and pensive looks if he
should join the Atomic Energy Commission as a defendant or if
defense attorney without joinder pleads Section 5 (b) (7) of the
Atomic Energy Act and demands a determination of the ownership
of the ores.
In cases of larceny or replevin of carnotite ores the court will
probably hold that the miner, by reason of the presence of vanadium in the ore, has a sufficient title whereby to be declared the
owner. The title to pitch blende might not be so readily determined.
Since it has been officially conceded, but as yet not legally
determined that locations for uranium ore may be made upon the
public domain in the same manner as other hard minerals, subject
however to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, we must look
to the Federal Mining Law of 1872, and the supplemental state
legislation of the several states in which uranium has been found.
There can be no valid mining claim without the discovery of
mineral. The Act of 1872, among other things, says: ". . . but no
location of a mining claim can be made until the discovery of the
vein or lode within the limits of the claim located."
The courts have said generally that to constitute discovery, it
is necessary that minerals be found under such circumstances and
of such character that a reasonably prudent man, not necessarily a
skilled miner, would be justified in expending time and money developing the claim with the reasonable expectation of finding ore
in paying quantities. It has also been held that a belief in the
existence of mineral not based on any discovery or tracing does not
meet this requirement. However, it is not essential that discovery
precede the location of the claim if it is made prior to an adverse
location or prior to the land being withdrawn from entry.
Since it is generally believed that all of the surface deposits
of uranium ores in Colorado and Utah have been located by discovery on the canyon and valley rims, and since those deposits seem
to occur in horizontal beds of varying size and thickness, it. has become the practice for locators to locate claims back of the rim by
performing all of the required steps of location except the discovery of mineral which, if it exists, can only be determined by
drilling to a depth dependent upon the surface topography but in
many instances several hundred feet. If ore is found in a drill hole,
other drilling must be done to determine so far as possible, the extent of the ore body and its value, and thereafter to sink a shaft or
drive an incline to it, so that it may be mined. Obviously this re-
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quires amounts of money not possessed by the average prospector
or miner.
It has also become the custom in many instances under Colorado law, which requires that the discoverer shall sink a shaft,
open cut, cross-cut or tunnel which shall cut the lode at the depth of
10 feet below the surface, for the locator to bulldoze at the point of
his discovery notice, a ten-foot excavation. Such discovery work is
not required in Utah.
Many thousands of such locations without mineral discovery
have been made in Colorado and Utah. Such locations through this
country have been and are being in the main, respected, because
an adverse locator would be required to stake out a claim, move in
a drilling rig, and proceed with expensive drilling in order to find
out whether or not a mineral deposit existed within his claim beneath the surface of the earth. This seems to be the same situation
and the same problem which confronted oil and gas prospectors
prior to the Leasing Act of 1920.
The Supreme Court in Cole v. Ralph,' stated:
Location is the act or series of acts whereby the
boundaries of the claim are marked, etc., but it confers no
right in the absence of discovery, both being essential to a
valid claim. . . . In practice discovery usually precedes
location, and the statute treats it as the initial act. But,
in the absence of an intervening right, it is no objection
that the usual and statutory order is reversed. In. such a
case the location becomes effective from the date of discovery; but in the presence of an intervening right it
must remain of no effect.
And, in advance of discovery, the Court said at page 576:
. . . an explorer in actual occupation and diligently
searching for mineral is treated as a licensee or tenant at
will, and no right can be initiated or acquired through a
forcible, fraudulent or clandestine intrusion upon his possession. But if his occupancy be relaxed, or be merely incidental to something other than a diligent search for
mineral and another enters peaceably and not fraudulently
or clandestinely and makes a mineral discovery and location, the location so made is valid and must be respected
accordingly.
It is the custom of locators without discovery to perform what
they call assessment work and file affidavits so stating. If the work
and expenditure is directed to the search for minerals and is carried on with reasonable diligence undoubtedly the locator's possessory right for a reasonable period should be upheld but, of
course, this does not answer the lack of mineral discovery.
'252 U. S. 286.
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The question of extralateral rights on carnotite claims has not
arisen, and probably will not by reason of the horizontal nature of
the deposits. I recall, however, that I patented some carnotite claims
in Montrose County about forty years ago wherein extralateral
rights were granted in the patent.
Public Law 250, passed by the recent Congress, was primarily
intended to validate mining claims located subsequent to July 31,
1939 and prior to January 1, 1953 where such locations had been
made within the area of an oil and gas lease from the United States.
At least two questions respecting such locations may be presented. First, would this Act, upon compliance therewith, validate
any such locations without a valid discovery therein made prior to
January 1, 1953? Second, if there were a valid discovery upon such
claim, would the failure of the locator to perform the annual labor
thereon, lay such claim open to relocation by a third party?
Mr. Traylor was confronted with this problem in a case in
Grand County, Utah. However, the case was settled without a ruling on this point.
Section (b) of this Act reads:
Labor performed or improvements made upon or for
the benefit of such mining claims after the original location thereof, shall be recognized as applicable thereto for
all purposes to the same effect as labor performed and improvements made upon or for the benefit of mining claims
which are not affected by this Act.
Uranium mining leases have of course been issued by the Commission, and applications for leases under Circular 7 have been
filed in the Grand Junction office. I do not know whether any lease
as yet has been granted.
The Multiple Use Bill of Congressmen Aspinall and Dawson
now pending, as I read it, is, among other things, intended to cover
lease applications and leases issued under Circular 7. We are hopeful that it will be speedily passed in some form to eliminate the
leasing system provided in Circular 7, and otherwise clarify miners'
rights in making locations of uranium claims.
As an aside it is to be noted that the form of lease to be issued under Circular 7 among other things provides, "Assignment
of this lease may be made only upon approval of the Commission."
There is no provision against subletting. It is further stated that
no assignment will be approved which provides for a royalty in excess of 15% of gross ore receipts less haulage and development allowances.
We have expressed the opinion that this provision does not
prevent subleasing for a greater royalty, and that such sublease
does not require the approval of the Commission. If the Commission
disagrees with this construction, it could solve it by instructing its
ore buyers not to pay the sublessor more than 15% of the proceeds;
and then he would have to sue which, in the ordinary case, would
be prohibitive.
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The problem of taxation of the production of uranium is present. Unpatented mining claims in Colorado are subject to acreage
taxation. It has been held by the Supreme Court of the United
States as well as the State of Colorado that the estate in an unpatented mining claim is property, subject to taxation. Notwithstanding this judicial declaration of taxable status, the possessory
title up to this time has not been assessed. The 1953 Utah Assessment of Mines statute provides for the assessment of all metaliferous mines and mining claims to be assessed at $5.00 per acre, together with two times the average net annual proceeds for the three
calendar years next preceding, or for as many years next preceding as the mine has been operating, whichever is less.
It might prove embarrassing to the locators if the Utah Tax
Commission should decide to impose the $5.00 per acre tax upon
the several thousand locations in the counties of eastern Utah which
have been made and claimed without discovery of minerals. Embattled farmers are quite likely to insist that taxing authorities of
both states impose the tax if a few more uranium millionaires lift
up their modest heads above the orchids.
On August 13, 1953, Congress amended the Atomic Energy
Act by striking out the last sentence of Section 9 (b) reading:
The Commission and the property, activities and income of the Commission are hereby expressly exempt from
taxation in any manner or form in any state, county,
municipality or any subdivision thereof.
The Act is effective as to tax liabilities which accrued on or after
October 1, 1953. This leaves the Commission on a par with other
property owning Federal agencies, and it remains to be seen what
the taxing authorities may be able to do.
As to taxes on the production of uranium ores from premises
leased by the Commission, it would seem difficult for the lessee to
escape that tax. While the United States is the owner of the leased
premises and the Commission the sole purchaser of the ores, it
would appear that at least for tax purposes, legal title to such ores
is in the lessee, and no tax is attempted to be placed upon the government by levying such production tax.
In 1950 I had an article in the Rocky Mountain Law Review
entitled Proposals to Amend the Mining Laws Relating to Hard
Minerals. The only change suggested was to ask the Colorado Legislature to repeal the requirement of the ten-foot discovery cut in
order that Colorado uranium miners might be placed on an equal
footing with Utah uranium miners. At that time I had no idea of
the millions of acres under oil and gas leases on the Colorado Plateau, or that the Bureau of Land Management had ruled that no
valid mineral location could be made within the area covered by
such leases.
Paraphrasing Mark Anthony-I did not come to bury the
Atomic Energy Act, nor yet to praise it. The excerpts from the
laws and the administrative declarations which I have cited, I
submit as sufficient justification for my own uncertainties.
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